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INTRODUCTION
The armed conflict in Southern 
Philippines has continued for more than 
four centuries and is considered one of the 
world’s “longest” and “bloodiest” running 
armed conflicts (Philippine Free Press, May 
27, 2000).  It is also known as the “largest and 
most persistent armed conflict in Southeast 
Asia.” It resulted in the destruction of 
properties and livelihood, displacement of 
thousands of families, deaths of thousands 
of combatants from both sides, and innocent 
civilians including women and children 
killed in the crossfire (Tan in Krishna and 
Tan, 2003: 98). 
The conflict is also damaging the 
country’s image and creates the impression 
that the Philippines is a virtual war zone and 
a “haven” for “terrorists” and “insurgents,” 
thus contributing tremendously to the 
political and economic instability of the 
country. The global “War on Terror” 
spearheaded by the Bush administration has 
encouraged prejudice and discrimination 
against Muslim communities who are labeled 
“terrorists.” For example, the governments of 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States have made 
periodic advisories that restrict travel of their 
citizens to Mindanao for “security” reasons 
(American Chamber of Commerce of the 
Philippines, 2003). 
This study is aimed towards critical 
understanding of the historical, socio-
political, cultural and economic factors that 
contribute to the violent conflict in Southern 
Philippines and how the roots and causes 
of this conflict are being addressed at the 
moment both by the Philippine government 
and the different liberationist groups who 
are the main actors in the conflict.
DISCUSSION
Brief Historical Sketch of the Conflict
The conflict in Southern Philippines 
has a long and deep-seated historical root 
that goes back to the Spanish and American 
colonial period. Islam started to spread in the 
Philippine archipelago in the late 14th century 
and began to take root and interwoven into 
the indigenous customs and traditions of the 
Moros. Thus, when the Spaniards arrived 
in the early part of 16th century (1521), 
the Muslims were already an established 
sovereignty, and Islam had already gained 
wide acceptance among the inhabitants of 
Mindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan 
(Majul, 1999: 78; Osais and Lorenza, 1931: 
139; Laubach, 1925: 57). Gowing notes that 
shortly before the Spaniards came, Islam 
had already reached Manila and had gained 
prominence in some parts of Luzon. Manila 
was then ruled by Rajah Sulayman and his 
uncle Lakandula, who were relatives of the 
Sultan of Brunei (Gowing, 1983: 8-10). 
The Spaniards were able to Christianize 
almost all parts of Luzon and the Visayas in a 
short span of time but were met with strong 
and bloody resistance in Mindanao. In their 
attempts to subjugate and colonize the entire 
Mindanao, the Spaniards enlisted many 
of their Christian converts as “mercenary” 
soldiers to fight against the Moros in the 
South (Canoy, 1987: 30). The perceived 
“connivance” and support of Christianized 
Filipinos of the Spaniard’s conquest of 
Mindanao had angered many Muslims and 
worsened the gap between them (Isidro and 
Saber, 1967: 36-37).  
During the American occupation (1899-
1946), the conflict between Christians and 
Muslims had become more intense.  The 
American policy towards the Moros was at 
first congenial and accommodating. In trying 
to avoid getting meshed up in the conflict that 
the Spaniards had already created between 
Christians and Muslims, the Americans had 
adopted a “non-interference” policy towards 
the Moro affairs by acknowledging the 
protocols and agreement signed in the 1878 
treaty between the Sulu Sultanate and Spain. 
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However, when met with fierce resistance 
from the Moros who strongly refused to 
be subjugated, the Americans decided to 
unilaterally revoke the treaty, enforced 
stricter laws and policies towards the Moros 
and started to employ military force to rule 
the Moroland (Mendoza, 1999: 3-6). 
This drastic move by the Americans 
caused serious disruption in the Moro socio-
political structure. The Muslims felt cheated 
because although they were not subdued 
by the Spaniards they were included in 
the sale of the Philippines to America by 
virtue of the Treaty of Paris. The Treaty of 
Paris was an agreement signed between 
the Spaniards and the Americans when the 
Spaniards finally turned over the control of 
the Philippine archipelago to their American 
successors. The Muslims then were forced to 
be integrated to the mainstream Philippine 
politics, thus, lumped into one group with 
two distinct cultures. Ben Alforque describes 
this process as “the merging of conflictive 
history and the integration of the opposites” 
(Alfourque, 2001).
The Moro resistance was weakened 
by years of bloody confrontations which 
subsequently led to the introduction of 
the American system of government and 
the speedy integration of the Moros into a 
united, self-governing Philippines. In the 
early 1900s, Christianized Filipino natives 
were encouraged to migrate to Moroland 
under the catchword, “Mindanao, the land 
of promise” (Gowing and McAmis, 1974: 54). 
This resulted in more violent confrontations 
between Christians and Muslims in 
Mindanao. Christianized Filipinos were also 
given increasing powers in the administration 
of the Moro land. 
By 1916, the newly organized and fully 
“Filipinized” Philippine Legislature assumed 
legislative control over Mindanao and Sulu. 
Domestic matters in Moro land were put 
under the control of Christianized Filipinos 
(Man, 1990: 55). This transmigration program 
and turning over of control to Christian 
migrants have altered ethnic, cultural, 
religious, economic and political balance in 
Mindanao. It also engendered a deep sense 
of resentment that was continuously fed 
by integrationist policies that have largely 
ignored Islamic cultural, religious and 
political traditions (Costello, 1992: 40-41). 
After the Second World War, Christian 
migration to Mindanao became more rapid. 
The gap between Christians and Moros 
was widened as Christian Filipinos gained 
more access and benefits to education and 
economic opportunities. Christians began to 
dominate the economic and political spheres 
even in some predominantly Moro areas. Tan 
points out that between 1950-1960, Christian 
business men, industrialists, loggers and 
politicians in collaboration with Moro elites 
dispossessed Moros and lumads of their 
lands through title frauds, tedious application 
procedures, and costly legal processes. 
As a result, the Muslims who held 98 
percent of the lands in Mindanao and Sulu 
before the turn of the 20th century, ended up 
in 1976 owning less than 17 percent, mostly 
remote and infertile land (Mercado, 2009: 224-
225). Exploitative economic activities which 
have mainly favored Christian migrants, 
have exacerbated disparities and further 
fueled feelings of alienation and deprivation 
among Muslims (Islam, 1998: 452). It was 
against this socio-political and economic 
context that the revolutionary separatist 
Islamic movements began to rise and fought 
against the Philippine government (Mitsuo 
et.al, 2001: 118-119).  
From 1965 to 1971, political organizations 
composed mostly of Moro students began 
to rise and waged numerous campaigns 
for the recognition of the Moro’s rights for 
self-determination as a people with distinct 
history and identity. The movement resulted 
in the establishment of the first Muslim 
revolutionary group, the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) founded by young 
Muslim activists headed by Nur Misuari, a 
professor at the University of the Philippines 
(Dalupan, 2005: 233). MNLF was founded on 
egalitarian ideology which is characterized 
by a principled belief in the equality of all 
people in the political, economic, social 
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and civil realms regardless of differences in 
religion, race, ethnic origin and gender. 
The main goal of the MNLF is to achieve 
independence of the Bangsamoro Land which 
includes Sulu, Mindanao and Palawan, or 
otherwise known as MINSUPALA. In 1970, 
MNLF proclaimed itself as a political party 
composed of “freedom fighters” (otherwise 
known as the Bangsa Moro Army) and 
started to launch a protracted armed struggle 
against the Philippine government. This 
resulted in violent confrontations between 
Christian para-military groups (backed up by 
the Philippine army) and the MNLF soldiers. 
In 1972, Marcos declared Martial Law against 
the growing insurgency. The implementation 
of Martial Law had further pushed the 
Bangsamoro into armed resistance (Abinales, 
2000; Vitug and Gloria, 2000). The MNLF 
waged armed offensives and demanded 
recognition for an independent state for the 
Bangsamoro (Moro Homeland). From 1972 to 
1976, military and civilian casualties reached 
120, 000 (Bacani, 2005: 4).
The first peace talk between the MNLF 
and the Government Peace Panel was 
initiated in1976 through the assistance of the 
former Libyan leader Muamar al Gaddafi 
that resulted in the signing of the Tripoli 
agreement which tackled the Muslims’ 
demand for an autonomous Mindanao- a 
concession which was hoped to end the 
conflict. The Tripoli Agreement provided for 
a general ceasefire and called for autonomy 
under the broad principle that Mindanao 
would remain an integral part of the Republic 
of the Philippines. Despite the signing of 
the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, the war still 
continued between the MNLF warriors and 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) due 
to divergent interpretations and the absence 
of a clear guideline on the implementation of 
the agreement (McKenna, 1998: 165-166). 
Instead of implementing the provisions 
of the Tripoli Agreement, Marcos went ahead 
and held a referendum amid Moro charges 
that the government’s autonomy plan 
allowed only token self-rule. The insincerity 
of the dictatorial Marcos regime to implement 
the stipulations of the Tripoli Agreement 
had rendered it null and void and led to 
heightened wars and bloodshed. Subsequent 
moves by the Cory Aquino administration to 
arrive at an acceptable political arrangement 
such as the creation of the Autonomous 
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) had 
also failed to secure acceptance of the MNLF 
as recognized by the Philippine government 
the official representative organization of 
the Muslims in the Philippines before MILF 
(Nunez, 1997: 6). 
The ARMM was created on August 
1, 1989 by the Aquino administration to 
cater to the clamor for Moro autonomy. 
But in a plebiscite held in November of the 
same year, only four provinces-Lanao del 
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi 
out of thirteen voted to be included in the 
ARMM. Again, the Muslims dream for an 
Autonomous Muslim Mindanao did not 
materialize (Nunez, 1997: 7). 
Under the Ramos administration, there 
was the signing of agreement between the 
Philippine government and the MNLF in 
September 1996 which mandated the creation 
of the Southern Philippine Council for Peace 
and Development (SPCPD). It was intended 
to be an innovative political solution that 
builds in previous peace efforts (such as the 
Tripoli Agreement) within the parameters 
of the 1987 constitution. The agreement 
was more than just a political solution but 
an economic proposition. The agreement 
calls for the creation of a “special zone” and 
development that includes 14 provinces and 
9 cities in Mindanao (including Palawan). 
However, such areas that were made the 
focus of intense efforts for development 
did not bring any significant changes both 
in the political and economic condition of 
Mindanao (Nunez, 1997: xvi).
Nur Misuari was coopted by the 
government to head the SPCPD and later 
ran unopposed for the governorship of 
ARMM. However, he was accused by 
some revolutionary Muslim groups of 
having “inherited a bureaucracy that is 
tainted by corruption, internal wrangling 
109
Jerson Benia Narciso, --  A Historical Narrative and Critical Analysis of The Roots and Causes of 
Conflict In The Southern Philippines
and wastefulness (Nunez, 1997: 8).  It was 
observed that under Misuari’s leadership, 
the ARMM had become more economically 
depressed and faced enormous peace and 
order problems. It was also noted that during 
this time there was a significant increase 
of cases of violence in Mindanao. Muslim 
factionalism was seen as a major factor in 
the movement’s decline. Differing goals, 
traditional tribal rivalries, and competition 
among Moro leaders for control of the 
movement produced a three-way split in the 
MNLF during the late 1970s. However, some 
Muslim sectors believe that the weakening 
of the MNLF revolutionary movement was 
the result of the government’s attempts to 
polarize and divide Muslim communities 
(Dalupan in Haar and Busuttil, 2005: 235). 
The first break occurred in 1977 when 
Hashim Salamat, supported by ethnic 
Maguindanaos and Maranaos, formed 
a separate movement- the Bangsamoro 
Liberation Organization (BLO), which at first 
advocated a more moderate and conciliatory 
approach toward the government. This break 
which gained the support of the Maranaos 
and Maguindanaos, the second and the third 
largest Muslim ethnic groups in Mindanao 
had significantly weakened the more militant 
MNLF which is predominantly supported by 
the Tausogs, the biggest Muslim ethnic group 
based mostly in Sulu, Tawi-tawi and Basilan 
(Dalupan in Haar and Busuttil, 2005: 235). 
The founding of the BLO led to the formal 
establishment of the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) in 1980 with Hashim Salamat 
still at the helm of its leadership, as a splinter 
movement of the MNLF. The group is known 
to be more religiously oriented than its parent 
movement, emphasizing the promotion of 
Islamic ideals rather than the simple pursuit 
of autonomy based on nationalist objectives. 
The use of the term “Islamic” in the groups’ 
name was a deliberate move intended to 
distinguish it from the nationalist and more 
secular orientation of the MNLF. 
For the MILF, the core of the Bangsamoro 
struggle is “Islamic renewal” consisting of 
two interrelated components namely: Reform 
of Muslim political society; and religious 
reform. Islamic renewal is understood as “the 
transformation of behavior and attitudes and 
institutions in all levels of Moro society to 
harmonize them with the shariah” (Wadi, 
2000). towards “revitalized” Islamic society 
in which a Muslim leader “stands as a 
symbol of the rule of Divine Law over human 
society. The main political aspiration of the 
MILF as declared by its founder, Ustadz 
Hashim Salamat, is the creation of a separate 
Islamic state in all areas where Muslims are a 
majority in the Southern Philippines. These 
areas as defined by the MILF include: Parts 
of the Zamboanga peninsula, Davao, Central 
Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, tawi-tawi and 
Palawan.
This political objective of creating a 
separate Islamic state known as the Mindanao 
Islamic Republic (MIR) seeks to establish 
a system of government that upholds and 
applies Islamic law (shariah) in all aspects 
of daily life. This goal is to be achieved 
through a two-pronged program of da’wa 
(preaching) and revolutionary activities 
(jihad) against the Philippine government 
(Far Eastern Economic Review, February 23, 
19995; Asiaweek, April 3, 1998). Emphasizing 
that politics and religion are inseparable 
realms, the MILF gives the ulama prominent 
leadership and advisory roles and maintains 
that all its camps and military structures 
are also places of worship for its fighters 
(Gutierrez in Gaerland and Stankovitch, 
2000: 152).
The second splinter group is the Abu 
Sayyaf (“bearer of the sword”) known to 
be a self-styled fundamentalist insurgent 
movement which was founded by Abdurajak 
Janjalani in 1989. This group was originally 
known as the Mujahideen Commando 
Freedom Fighters (MCFF). In 1992, the 
MCFF was renamed the Jundullah (literally, 
“Servants of Allah”), and then the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG) in 1993. The group 
calls itself “Al-Harakat Al-Islamiyya” or the 
Islamic movement (http://www.fas.org/
irp/world/para/asg.htm,date accessed: 12/ 
08/11).
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It is governed by an Executive Committee 
headed by a Caliph and eight other religious 
leaders. This executive committee constitutes 
the so-called MINSUPALA Islamic 
Theocratic State Shadow Government 
(MIT-SG) (The Philippines NICA, 1996: 
6-9). The main objective of the Abu Sayyaf 
is the establishment of an independent and 
exclusive Islamic state in Mindanao. Unlike 
MNLF and MILF which merely aim for 
independence, the Abu Sayyaf espouses 
violent religious intolerance, advocating 
the deliberate targeting of Christians 
in Mindanao. Its militant radicalism 
and extremism is directed towards the 
advancement of the Muslims’ struggle which 
they believed was betrayed by the MNLF 
when it conceded to sign a peace agreement 
with the government (Abubakar in Nathan 
and Kamali, 2005: 54). 
In terms of revolutionary political 
violence, virtually all of Abu Sayyaf’s 
activities are considered by the government 
as terrorist in nature. Since its inception in 
the early 1990s, the group is known for its 
bombings, kidnappings, assassinations and 
extortion activities. All these as they claim 
are part of what they describe as “their fight 
for an independent Islamic state” (Nankivell 
and Bontilier, 2007: 116). 
Sporadic but continues attacks of 
the MILF against  the government troops 
in Mindanao had led to the  declaration 
of a “Total War Policy” by the Estrada 
administration in 2000 which resulted in the 
suspension of peace talks, and later, to the 
declaration of jihad by Hashim Salamat, the 
chairman of the MILF against the Philippine 
government. This led to more violent wars 
and bloodshed, as the government launched 
all-out and massive attacks and occupation 
of MILF camps and as the MILF had adopted 
a guerilla type of warfare against the 
government military troops. 
The Arroyo administration had earlier 
shown signs of hope for the resumption 
of peace talks as it declared a unilateral 
ceasefire and initiated exploratory talks with 
the MILF. This peace program however was 
short lived since the Arroyo administration 
had soon adopted the “all-out war” policy 
of the deposed Estrada administration after 
the negotiation of the 2001 Tripoli Peace 
Agreement had ended in a deadlock. 
The current “Noynoy” Benigno Aquino 
administration has expressed willingness to 
give priority to the peace process in Mindanao. 
Earlier in his inaugural speech in June 30, 
2010 published in national and international 
newspapers, Aquino has promised the 
Filipino people of genuine democracy, peace 
and prosperity and to eliminate widespread 
violence and corruption that has plagued the 
country for many years and pursue peace 
talks with MNLF, MILF and the Abusayafs. 
Aquino also assured the public that his 
administration will be “sincere in dealing 
with the peoples of Mindanao and will pursue 
a peaceful and just settlement of conflict 
inclusive of the interests of all-may they be 
Lumads, Bangsamoro or Christian” (Manila 
Bulletin Newspaper Online: “Noynoy 
Aquino’s Inaugural Speech”, June 30, 2010). 
However, while peace negotiations are going 
on between the government peace panel and 
the MILF, no substantial development has 
been reached yet. 
As it shows, there is much work yet to 
be done, and unless the real roots and causes 
of the conflict are identified and addressed 
properly, peace will remain an illusive dream 
in Mindanao.
Critical Analysis of the Roots of the 
Conflict
Although armed conflict in Southern 
Philippines has been going on for decades, 
the roots and causes of this conflict is not 
generally well understood. Over the years, 
with the changing socio-political and 
cultural situations in Mindanao, the conflict 
has become more complex and complicated. 
Nevertheless, in spite of its complexities, in 
general, the roots of the armed conflict can be 
described in the following categories:
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Political
It is important to take note that before the 
arrival of the Spaniards, the Bangsamoro people 
were already in the process of state formation, 
and Islamic Institutions were already in place 
such as, mosques, religious schools and the 
political concept of sultanate (LaRousse, 2001: 
44). Samuel K. Tan notes that the Muslim 
political structure consisted of two levels: the 
power elite and There are no sources in the 
current document.Muslim masses. Authority 
was vested in a ruling elite of datus, sultans 
and other local oligarchies, while responsibility 
was exercised by the rest of the Muslim people. 
A council of elders (ruma bichara) advised the 
ruling class which bred autocratic rule. The 
activities of the community were therefore 
dictated by the interests of the elite. The 
datus and sultans inspired raids, uprisings 
and local rivalries. Thousands of Muslims 
perished in the defense of oligarchic interests. 
The Bangsamoro had their own government 
and they were already engaged in trade and 
diplomatic relations with other countries (Tan, 
1977: 58). They had developed well organized 
administrative and political systems; and strong 
maritime and infantry forces that defended the 
Bangsamoro territories from Western colonial 
intrusion, preserving the continuity of their 
independence (Linga, 2004; Junker, 2000).
With the Spanish invasion of Southern 
Philippines, the traditional Bangsamoro 
political system was disrupted which 
consequently led to revolts and bloody 
confrontations. Power in Muslim traditional 
society was (and to some extent still is) 
reckoned in terms of the number of followers 
a leader had. To achieve political rank is to 
have the ability to attract followers. High 
birth assured social distinction but not 
political power. It was even possible for one 
of very low birth to acquire power. Everyone 
has access to political power (Gowing, 1983: 
41). Thus, basically, the problem involves 
the conflict between the traditional social 
and political patterns of the Muslims and 
the new constitutional patterns or ‘modern 
government’ imposed by their Spanish 
colonizers (Gowing, 1983: 43).
The Bangsamoro people insist that 
Mindanao and the rest of the Southern 
Philippines had never been under the 
sovereignty and control of Spain. In spite of 
Spain’s massive and relentless attack against 
the Muslims, and in spite of the fact that it 
had penetrated some parts of Mindanao by 
the use of superior military power which 
resulted  in the fall of Jolo, the strongest 
center of Moro power in 1876, Spain’s 
victory was never permanent and complete. 
There was a unified body politic outside 
the Spanish colonial hegemony from which 
the Philippine state emerged. Bangsamoro 
political activists assert their dynastic realms 
are more fundamental than the contemporary 
nation-state itself (Mastura, 2007: 76). 
The imposition of the American colonial 
rules and policies had further displaced 
Islamic laws and polarized interests and 
loyalties among different Muslim tribes, 
clans and communities which consequently 
prevented them as a people from forging a 
unified resistance against their colonizers. 
It also fueled internal conflicts and rivalries 
among Muslim leaders and communities. 
The interventions of the American colonial 
government in Muslim internal conflicts 
allowed them to initiate and preserve the 
“divide and conquer” policy in relation to 
Muslim societies (Tan, 1977: 4).  The American 
colonizers had in the process reduced 
traditional leaders to virtual impotence (Tan, 
1977: 20). 
The Americans, with more superior 
and devastating military power had further 
emasculated the datuship and sultanate’s 
political power and made political 
compromise more urgent. By the first decade 
of American rule, Muslim leadership had 
become divided- one faction continuing the 
anti-colonial struggle and the other accepting 
the new option of compromise in a liberal 
democracy. With the Sultanate’s political 
collapse (who were only allowed to retain 
their spiritual power), the Muslims lost the 
political influence they had enjoyed for 
centuries (Tan, 1993: 9). 
112
Kawistara, Vol. 2, No. 2, 17 Agustus 2012: 105-120
The integration of the Christian Filipino 
leadership into the American colonial 
administration’s democratic structure as 
active partner exacerbated the Muslims’ 
frustrations in the struggle to recover their 
lost power. This meant that the Muslims had 
not only lost power to the Americans but also 
to the Christian Filipinos, a political reality 
whose psychological impact on Muslim 
consciousness would find its expression 
in the expansion of the Muslim struggle to 
include the campaign against the Christian 
Filipino leadership (Tan, 1993: 10). 
Other than their historical experience 
in state formation, the Bangsamoro people 
cite political discrimination and oppression 
they have suffered from the Republic of the 
Philippines. The biases and prejudices of 
the Christian majority population towards 
the Muslims; the minoritization of the 
Bangsamoro in their own homeland, failure 
of the government to provide adequate social 
services have caused untold sufferings among 
the Muslim populace in Mindanao and 
resulted in the establishment of revolutionary 
Islamic organizations fighting for freedom 
and independence of the Moro people 
(Cojuangco, 1989; Gowing, 1983: 43). Bishop 
Quevedo views the cause of the conflict as 
injustice. It is “injustice to Moro identity; 
injustice to Moro political sovereignty; and 
injustice to Moro integral development. He 
concludes that it is this just and fundamental 
Moro aspiration for freedom that must be 
at the heart of all political negotiations for a 
lasting peace” (Quevedo, 2003). 
Economic
The Spanish and American colonial 
regimes had caused tremendous effects 
in the economic life of the Moro people. 
Earlier, the Spaniards’ intrusion in Mindanao 
had disrupted and destroyed the flow of 
trade between Muslims and outside traders 
which adversely affected the economic life 
of the Moro people. The Spaniards knew 
that Mindanao had trade connections 
with Malacca, Borneo and the Moluccas. 
Obviously, they wanted to cut the Brunei 
political and economic influences, control the 
trade and stop Brunei Sultanate from exacting 
tribute in areas under Spanish control. So, 
as Mckenna points out, while there is an 
undeniable religious motive behind the 
conquest, there is more evidence to show 
that the objective was mainly to “monopolize 
trade, controlling resources, and collecting 
tribute (McKenna, 1988: 82).
Jubair contends that “Spain came to the 
Philippines not so much for the cross, but 
in most instances, as facts of her actuations 
were gradually exposed, religion was 
merely used to justify what otherwise was 
a Satanic lust for worldly gain and glory” 
(Jubair, 1999: 39). Scott corroborates the same 
view by insisting that “the cross followed 
commerce and not vice versa, and that Kings 
and Emperors would accordingly outfit 
expensive expeditions and sacrifice their 
subjects’ lives not out of religious fanaticism 
but out of hope for gain.” He further insists 
that, “Spanish-Muslim relations would 
therefore be characterized not by hatred of 
Islam but by love of profit (Scott, 1994: 112). 
The breakdown in their once robust 
economic system has reduced many Muslims 
to extreme poverty indignity and exploitation. 
This problem was further aggravated when 
the Americans opened the gates of Mindanao 
to Christian migrants from Luzon and the 
Visayas which eventually led to the loss of the 
Moro people’s ancestral land. The Quirino-
Recto colonization Act of 1935 encouraged 
Christian settlement of the South by opening 
large tracts of land in Mindanao to Christian 
settlers with government assistance in cash 
and materials. In 1936, Common wealth Act 
no. 75 was approved. It abolished the Bureau 
of non-Christian Tribes and replaced it with 
the Office of the Commissioner for Mindanao 
and Sulu giving Christian Filipinos more 
economic benefits and more influence in 
Muslim areas (Tan, 1977: 67). 
Taxation hardened Muslim opposition 
to the government. It deprived datus of old 
privileges and sources of wealth. Muslims 
also viewed it as a symbol of submission 
and never as a reciprocal responsibility 
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of the governed to the government. They 
considered taxation as an obligation of the 
weak and the subordinate. In contrast, they 
regarded religious levies and those imposed 
by the Muslim ruling class as proper because 
they were in accordance with God’s decrees 
and with customary laws. Paying taxes to 
foreigners was therefore contrary to God’s 
will and tradition (Tan, 197736-37). 
The major bone of contention is land. The 
Muslim Filipinos occupy most of the finest 
and incredibly fertile land in Mindanao-
argued as Ancestral land. But much of these 
lands had been marked off by the Philippine 
government for resettlement by non-Muslims 
from Luzon and the Visayas to alleviate 
population and land pressures. Muslims 
resented the Government’s parceling out 
land they feel belongs to them, and failing 
to win their case in the courts they have on 
numerous occasions resorted to arms and 
violence (Rasul, 1979: 26). 
The continued armed conflict in 
Mindanao has also severely affected the 
economic conditions of the Moro people. 
Because of the conflict people are deprived 
of productive economic activities that could 
have facilitated economic progress. Lives are 
destroyed, communities and families torn 
apart, cultures decline and investment is 
foregone or deflected. Studies have shown 
that the 10 bottom provinces with the lowest 
per capita income, the highest poverty 
incidence, and the worst standard of living 
are found in predominantly Muslim areas in 
Mindanao (Philippine Human Development 
Report on Peace, Human Security and Human 
Development in the Philippines, 2005).
The Marginalization and discrimination 
of Muslims by the government and by 
the majority Christian Filipinos has also 
prevented them access to education, gainful 
employment and equal economic benefits. 
Prejudices and negative stereotypes of 
Muslims have also affected the delivery of 
basic social services to depressed areas in 
Mindanao, thus contributing significantly 
to their economic woes. The present Aquino 
government in spite of its flagship job creation 
program, the Public Private Partnership 
(PPP), has failed to generate massive 
employment opportunities to alleviate 
poverty in Mindanao (Gowing, 1964: 29).
Ethno-Cultural
Hatred and prejudices between 
Christians and Muslims had been enforced 
and institutionalized during the colonial rule. 
The term “Moro” which Spanish colonialism 
created from pre-conceived notions carried 
all the negative sentiments and attitudes 
of western civilization against primitive 
societies particularly the Muslims in the 
South.  Based on Spanish sources, the general 
framework of Spanish historiography on the 
“Moros” was anchored on two impressions: 
(1) that the “Moros”, as the colonial sources 
called them, were a degraded race of savages 
whose only ambition was to plunder, 
guided strongly by a religion based on the 
teaching of a false prophet which they called 
“Muhammedanism;” (2) that their lack of 
civilization underlined the need to subjugate 
and civilize them through Christianization 
(Gowing, 1964: 29).
The term “Moro” was used to refer to 
the Islamized inhabitants of the archipelago, 
whose level of culture or civilization was 
conceived as “primitive” or below western 
concepts of human progress. All undesirable 
aspects of human behavior were associated 
with this level and the specific point of 
historical reference was the Spanish memory 
and perception of 7 centuries of Moorish rule 
in Spain, and from which the term Moro was 
derived. The term connotes cultural depravity, 
inferiority, and deficiency. The Americans 
adopted the same perception although they 
believe that however the Moros were prone 
to savagery and violence on account of lack of 
civilization and influence of Islam, they were 
nevertheless capable of learning the ways 
of civilized society if given the opportunity 
through the gradual democratization of their 
life and institutions (Gowing, 1964: 29). 
In general, the American colonial 
framework is based on the assumption 
of Muslims’ lack of civilization requiring 
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subjugation, conquest, and social change either 
through outright conversion to Christianity 
or through gradual democratization.
General Samuel S. Summer who 
commanded troops in Mindanao and Sulu 
declared:
“…it will be necessary to eradicate about 
all the customs that have heretofore 
governed the Moro’s habits of life. They 
are an essentially different people from 
us in thought, word and action and their 
religion will be a serious bar to any efforts 
towards Christian civilization. So long as 
Mohammedanism prevails, Anglo-Saxon 
civilization will make slow headway 
(Gowing, 1979: 36).
The Filipinization program from 1913 to 
the end of American rule in 1946 had widened 
more the cultural gap between Muslims 
and Christians. Primarily, Filipinization 
was aimed towards the inculcation of the 
majority Filipino culture, the eradication 
of Islamic culture (which was viewed as 
“counterproductive “and therefore, an 
“obstacle” in the way of progress) and 
finally, the mainstreaming and integration 
of “cultural minorities” to the Philippine 
republic with a view that it could resolve the 
seemingly endless conflict and realize peace 
and development in Mindanao. Steps taken 
by Christian Filipinos to solve the Muslim 
problem during the civil regime indicated 
an increasing influence of the theory that 
Filipinization and Christianization was the 
only way to stop Muslim resistance (Tan, 
1977: 67).
Quite to the contrary, after 1913, Muslim 
response to colonial repressive measures 
against rebelling elements and violations 
of colonial laws reinforced an anti-Filipino 
Christian bias which had its origin in the 
Spanish era when Christian Filipinos were 
used as soldiers or supporters in the Spanish 
campaigns. Colonial intrusion and the 
turning over of the leadership to Christian 
Filipinos resulted to a crisis of identity. To a 
large extent the Muslims believed that their 
Islamic roots were being threatened by the 
dynamic changes initiated by colonialism 
and Filipinism. The issue of survival had 
become more relevant as the Muslims 
struggled to protect their identity in the light 
of the change from American to Filipino rule 
(Tan, 1993: 19). 
Filipinism as an ideology was conceived 
by the Muslims as limited and relevant only 
to the aspirations of the Christian majority in 
the country. This brought to a powerful focus 
the convergence in the Muslim consciousness 
of their historical losses to colonialism and 
Filipinism, including the last and most 
sensitive—their Islamic identity. Many 
Muslims believe that they are denied of their 
rights to life, liberty and happiness because 
they are Muslims (Tan, 1993: 21).
Negative stereotypes against Muslims 
were opposed by Muslim sources whose 
framework is anchored on the premise 
that “Muslim Islamic traditions prove the 
existence of a civilized society which has 
utilized armed struggle, however savage it 
might have been, to preserve Muslim history 
and culture” (Tan, 2003: 4). The imposition 
and institutionalization of foreign cultures 
was conceived by the Muslims as an assault 
to their Islamic identity and a grave threat 
to the survival of Islam in Mindanao. For 
Muslims, defense of their faith and culture is 
a sacred duty and a fulfillment of God’s will.
Religious
The long years of Spanish missionary 
activities toward Hispanization and 
Christianization of Muslims in Mindanao 
had created deep schisms and religious 
prejudices between Christian and Muslim 
inhabitants of Mindanao. To see the religious 
and theological elements in the conflict, 
it is important to remember as Cayongcat 
suggests, that the “Spanish colonization of 
the Philippines was motivated and inspired 
by the European religious imperialism 
that insists on Christianity as the only true 
religion and the only way by which all men 
and women could be saved (Cayongcat, 1986: 
21). John Schumacher’s findings also reveal 
that the expansion of the Spanish Empire 
was motivated in part by “an overflow of the 
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crusading spirit” which drove out the Moros 
from the Iberian Peninsula in 1492. Thus, it 
appears that the Spanish conquest of the 
Philippines was a product of a rigid religious 
crusading zeal to “bring the life of the Gospel 
to the infidels in the newly discovered lands” 
(Schumacher, 1987: 21). 
Mission work and Evangelization 
of Muslims in Mindanao through the 
establishment of churches, sectarian schools, 
hospitals, relief and aid ministries, translation 
of Bibles to Muslim dialects, were meant to 
Christianize and shape up the attitudes and 
values of the Muslims along Christian lines. 
This religious motive was clearly spelled out 
in the Jesuits Missionary Letters to Mindanao 
(Arcilla, 1979: 30). With these, Catholicism 
was seen as indispensable part of the whole 
system of colonization. The establishment 
of Spanish sovereignty and the spread of 
Catholicism were seen by many Muslims as 
inseparable union of the Colonizers and the 
Catholic Church. 
Michael Mastura observes that “if 
anything was imbedded in the mind of 
the Moros, it was the fact that they became 
acquainted with Christianity through the 
methods of reduction and pacification 
campaigns” launched by the Spaniards 
against them.  Mastura (1976: 8) Against 
this claim, Soriano contends that a 
distinction between Spanish colonization 
and Christianization should be made for 
the reason that the Roman Catholic Church 
religion outlived Spanish colonialism and 
because “even if  the Church  had been part of 
the Spanish Imperialist scheme, it rose above 
the level of Spanish colonialism” (Soriano, 
1999: 146).
The same can almost be said about 
the Americans. The doctrine of “Manifest 
Destiny”- a conviction that God works for 
the good of the nations, and that the United 
States was the “primary agent of God’s 
meaningful activity in history” (Smylie, 1963: 
314) served as a theological justification for 
the American conquest of the Philippines. 
This concept of manifest destiny as Anderson 
observes was anchored on the assumption 
of the superior status of America being the 
center of human civilization and being the 
dispenser of “benevolent” benefits to the less 
fortunate (Anderson, 1969: 280). 
Borlado points out that the American 
conquest of the Philippines was by and large, 
a product of the “paranoia” of the Western 
culture which assumes that there is only one 
universal and normative culture by which 
all cultures must be judged namely, the 
Western culture and religion (borlado, 1996). 
Threatened by the loss of their religious and 
cultural identity and traditional power, the 
sultans, local datus and chieftains met the 
political challenge posed by Christianity by 
also rallying their people behind Islam, often 
portraying confrontations with the Spaniards 
and Americans as a jihad or holy war (Canoy, 
1987: 30-32). 
CONCLUSION
As shown in the study, the roots of the 
conflict in Mindanao can be summarized in 
four key elements (without prejudice to other 
elements that might have also contributed to 
the problem) namely: (1) Historical systematic 
domination; (2) Political domination and 
inferiorization (3) Economic marginalization 
and destitution; and; (4) Threatened Moro 
and Islamic identity (cultural and religious) 
(Tan, 1977: 12-30).
The historical experiences of colonization 
and foreign domination which led to defeats, 
losses, and humiliations have weighed 
heavily on the Muslim mind. Added to this 
is widespread and deep poverty, inequitable 
distribution of wealth, and control over 
resources, poor governance as seen in poor 
delivery of basic social services, corruption in 
government bureaucracy, political injustice, 
structural inequities and other forms of 
injustice and oppression that they have 
suffered in the hands of their colonizers and 
the Philippine government. The Moro people 
have been longing for the recovery of their 
lost causes and the restoration of their dignity 
and worth as a people. 
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To sum up, the Bangsamoro political 
struggle is geared towards recognition 
of their political sovereignty, the 
implementation of a just social order, the 
transformation of unjust political structures 
and the recognition of their Islamic culture 
and identity (Tan, 1977: 101). The overlaying 
of modern state structures over the Islamic 
bases of government as laid down in Islamic 
shari’ah norms, the annexation of Mindanao 
and Sulu in the course of decolonization 
from the United States, and the injustice and 
marginalization that they have suffered from 
Christianized Filipinos has not ceased to 
upset the Bangsamoro people.
The approaches to the Moro struggle 
have followed three historical options namely: 
integration, secessionism, and separatism, 
with the government consistently pursuing 
the integrationist alternative through the 
nationalization and Filipinization of the 
Muslim life and society, and until recently, 
the advocacy of regional autonomy as a 
compromise. But failure to substantially 
implement real autonomy has encouraged 
the development of Moro secessionist or 
separatist tendencies (Tan, 1977: 98). 
In general, the Philippine government 
has consistently maintained its integrationist 
policy to maintain its so-called “territorial 
integrity” against secessionism and in 
consonance with constitutional provisions 
and requirements.  Muslims on the other 
hand believe that they have the right to 
self-determination and the implementation 
of this fundamental right to determine 
their political status will certainly open a 
window of opportunity to resolve the long-
drawn conflict peacefully. They insist that 
constitutional and institutional barriers 
cannot be used as excuses to deny the Bangsa 
Moro people this right (Linga, 2005: 36). 
Emran Mohamad insists that “the 
challenge to the present Philippine 
government administration is to think 
outside of the box and that includes 
amending the Philippine constitution as a 
new formula in addressing the Bangsamoro 
people’s demand for self-determination” 
(Interview with Emran G. Mohamad, 
Senior Labor and Employment Officer of 
the Department of Labor and Employment 
in the Autonomous Region for Muslim 
Mindanao (DOLE-ARMM), Member of the 
Board of Trustees of Montana Development 
Program Incorporated (MDPI) and Member 
of the Working Committee during the formal 
opening of the GRP-MILF  Peace Talks in 
1999, Date of interview: 15 January, 2011).
The government has not made concrete 
actions to address the aspirations of the poor 
and marginalized majority Muslim masses. 
Instead, it caters to the whims and caprices 
of the Muslim powerful elites who are taking 
advantage of their positions at the expense of 
the weak, and therefore, privileging only the 
dominant segment of society. The dominance 
of the powerful and the marginalization of the 
poor and powerless has been the pattern of 
relationship that characterizes the Philippine 
society. In this case, the Moro struggle must 
be understood from below (the underside of 
Moro history), from the very core of the poor 
and struggling Muslim and other indigenous 
communities not from the macro perceptions 
of the Philippine government’s national 
interests and the Moro liberationists’ political 
agenda.
The government’s lukewarm support 
and indecisiveness to implement an 
equitable and effective peace agreement also 
hampered the peace process. There is no 
coherent and consistent policy on the part 
of the government on how armed conflict 
in Mindanao is supposed to be addressed. 
One example of this incoherence and 
inconsistencies is the “all-out war policy of 
President Estrada in 2000 which was reversed 
to an “all-out peace” policy by President 
Arroyo in 2001, only to revert back to “all-
out war” policy in 2002-2003 (Hernandez, 
2005). These inconsistencies are inevitably 
destroying the credibility of the government.
Another problem as cited by Bacani 
is the “bystander mentality” of Christian 
political elites in Mindanao “whose hold on 
political and economic power is threatened 
by any settlement.” These are local “political 
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leaders and groups that have substantial 
economic interests in continuing the armed 
conflict, who benefit legitimately or otherwise 
from large budgets in times of war,” and 
who will accept a peace agreement as long 
as it involves “only the Muslims and the 
existing autonomous region” and as long as 
the agreement “does not exact even an inch 
of concession from the Christian majority 
(Bacani, 2005).
The Philippine government’s militaristic 
and repressive approaches to armed 
conflict based on the belief that rebellion 
and insurgencies are best handled through 
decisive military response, has resulted to 
further resistance and retaliation resulting 
to social and economic dislocation. Powerful 
interests also stand to benefit from it, not the 
least of whom are some groups in the military 
and politicians for whom opportunities 
for corruption increase with bloated war 
appropriations. Those who stand to benefit 
from a war have an interest in provoking 
it or manipulating “events on the ground” 
(UNDP, 2005: 33). 
The pacification and demobilization 
approaches employed by the government 
which seeks to address the conflict by 
cooptation of leaders and followers through 
the offer of positions, or livelihood, or 
integration has left the deeper roots of 
the conflict unaddressed. One prominent 
example of this practice of cooptation of 
Muslim leaders in exchange for lucrative 
benefits which have been a consistent 
formula in many administrations was the 
appointment of Nur Misuari as governor of 
ARRM. This practice has been described as 
“oiling” or “greasing” only the parts of the 
machine that squeak, without regard for the 
corrosion of the rest.
On the Muslims’ side, remedies 
toward the resolution of the conflict have 
been forwarded and widely discussed 
among different Islamic organizations 
and institutions but no substantial unity 
has been achieved yet. Within and among 
Moro leadership and communities, there 
are divergent perspectives and agenda that 
further complicate the problem. For instance, 
while the nationalist MNLF leadership opens 
up for negotiations towards expanded and 
genuine autonomy in Muslim Mindanao, 
the Islamist MILF leadership has firmly 
maintained its demand for independence 
and separation from the Philippine body 
politics. Islamists can be categorized as 
“Muslims who feel compelled to act on 
the belief that Islam demands social and 
political activism, to create a separate union 
for Muslim communities.” Religion in this 
sense can be said to “animate nationalism” 
by providing meaning and intelligibility for 
Muslim minorities (Hafez, 2004: 3-5). 
In the same vein of thought, Sayyid refers 
to Islamists as “those who use the language 
of Islamic metaphors to think through their 
political destinies, those who see in Islam 
their political future (Sayyid, 2003). The 
vision of a separate Islamic state, Syukri 
observes is “predicated not only on perceived 
religious injunctions that Muslims need to 
live within a state defined with reference 
to their religion, but also on the notion that 
such entity existed in a territorial form in 
the past and predated the creation of the 
modern nation-state by Western enterprise of 
colonialism” (Syukri, 1985). The MILF’s main 
objective is to “make supreme the word of 
Allah and establish Islam in the Bangsamoro 
homeland” (McKenna, 1998: 208).
Factionalism in Muslim leadership was 
said to have been exploited to serve the 
interest of the government.  In that sense, 
they were no better than power brokers 
of the old political order as they remained 
to be the only channel of access to the top. 
Consequently, majority of the Muslim masses 
showed very little support in the currents of 
political actions they espoused. As it appears, 
the current Moro armed conflict as described 
by the United Nations’ Development 
program (UNDP) is “the sharpest expression 
of the clash between two imagined nations 
or nationalisms, Filipino and Moro, each 
with their own narrative of the conflict” 
(Philippine Human Development Report, 
2005) and each with their own version of 
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solution to the problem. For the Moro people, 
it is a matter of rectifying the long-standing 
political injustice that they have suffered 
in the hands of the Philippine government. 
For the Philippine nation-state, it is a 
matter of defending its territorial integrity 
against secessionism. In sum, the conflict is 
“a veritable case of irresistible forces, and 
immovable objects” (UNDP, 2005: 65).
Amina Rasul believes that the current 
conflict in Mindanao is “not between Muslims 
and Christians, but rather between an 
oppressed minority and a largely indifferent 
government.” (Rasul, 2011). Obviously, power 
and resources are concentrated in the hands 
of a few political elites (including religious 
elites) while the masses (mostly Muslims) 
are being pushed to the periphery of human 
existence. The ties of traditional Muslim elite 
leadership with the central government has 
kept the Muslim struggle within what the 
central government perceived as “controllable 
level” and has deprived the Moro masses of 
their right to self-determination. This is the 
context in which the Moro people’s demands 
for freedom and independence should be 
understood. 
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